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Abstract
Social networks offer a ready channel for fake and misleading news to spread and exert
influence. This paper examines the performance of different reputation algorithms when applied
to a large and statistically significant portion of the news that are spread via Twitter. Our main
result is that simple algorithms based on the identity of the users spreading the news, as well
as the words appearing in the titles and descriptions of the linked articles, are able to identify a
large portion of fake or misleading news, while incurring only very low (< 1%) false positive rates
for mainstream websites. We believe that these algorithms can be used as the basis of practical,
large-scale systems for indicating to consumers which news sites deserve careful scrutiny and
skepticism.
1 Introduction
Social networks such as Facebook and Twitter offer fake news the means to spread, and the res-
onance chambers where users can consume and reshare them Allcott and Gentzkow (2017). This
situation has prompted the research community to create the means to identify and label fake
news as they spread across social networks; Shu et al. (2017) provides an excellent and up to date
overview of such research.
Previous experiments with fake news detection focused on curated sets that captured only a
portion of what is shared. Our interest here lies in the question of how fake news detection systems
perform when applied to the full variety of news being shared via Twitter. What performance can
be obtained? How do the algorithms behave on news from well-known websites? How effective are
the methods in unearthing previously unknown websites that spread fake or misleading news?
To answer these questions, over a period of several months, we collected a large subset of URLs
shared on Twitter pointing to news articles, including all the news posted on mainstream sites and
agencies, all the news from selected scientific and peer reviewed publications, all the news from
hundreds of sites that have appeared in published curated lists of sites with dubious reputation or
low editorial controls, and all news being spread by a selected group of Twitter users we chose to
follow. This initial set was then augmented with the result of queries aimed at dataset completion,
finding additional users who shared the news, and additional news shared by users in our dataset.
The result is a dataset consisting of 5.5 million news articles, 88 million tweets, and 9 million users.
For each news article, we collected both the item title and description, and the identities of the users
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who shared the item. Our experiments are carried out over temporal slices generally consisting of
1.4 million news and 20 million tweets.
We experimented with three algorithms for identifying fake or misleading news. The first
algorithm, from Tacchini et al. (2017), uses the users that spread a piece of news, and optionally
the title and description words, as features, and builds a logistic-regression classifier. The second
algorithm is a variant in which the user identities are first aggregated via topic modeling Blei et al.
(2003). The third algorithm is a graph-based crowdsourcing algorithm from de Alfaro et al. (2015);
Tacchini et al. (2017). All of these algorithms are well suited for large-scale implementation.
Our ground truth consists in two independently developed lists of low quality news sites: the
Opensources list Opensources (2017), and a list from Metacert1; each list comprises about 500
sites.
Our main result consists in showing that the algorithms can be adapted, trained, and tuned to
successfully discover a significant portion of the low-quality news in our test dataset (above 50% by
default, or above 85% when limiting the comparison to fake news with more than 10 tweets, which
constitute the most “viral” news), while incurring a false positive rate on mainstream news below
1%. In preliminary user trials, we observed this low false positive rate to be essential: mainstream
reliable media such as the major newspapers produces a very large amount of news daily, and even
a small fraction labeled erroneously as fake translates in a large number of incorrectly flagged news,
eroding user confidence in the system. We provide extensive results on how the algorithms perform
on individual news sites, both mainstream and lesser known.
Furthermore, we show that these algorithms are able to generalize from known low-quality news
sites to other sites that deserve to be scrutinized. In particular, we show that starting from one of
our ground truths, we can recover a majority of the sites belonging to the other ground truth.
Together, these results indicate that the algorithms can perform well when applied to the full
set of news items shared via Twitter, an essential milestone for their wider adoption. We like to
think of these algorithms as reputation systems for news, rather than proper fake news detection
algorithms. These algorithms are too shallow semantically to be able to actually discern genuine
from fake news; this is a task best carried out by humans, or by systems performing a much
deeper analysis of the text, and requires taking into account a broader context. Our aim is more
modestly to show that reputation systems with high predictive value and low false positive rate on
mainstream news are achievable in practice.
The system for fake news detection described in this paper has been implemented as part of
the Truth Value Project, and it is available as a service at the URL https://truthvalue.org The
Truth Value Project system continuously collects information from Twitter, and it allows uses to
query the system for the reputation of any arbitrary news article, identified by its URLs. Users
can also vote news articles as being reliable, or fake/misleading; the users’ opinions are weighted
(positively or negatively) depending on their reputation. Additionally, we offer two other ways to
interact with our system: we provide a Twitter bot (hoaxbot) that can respond to enquiries from
the users, and a browser bookmarklet which enables users to quickly access the scores of sites they
are accessign with their browser.
2 Related Work
Fake news is a phenomenon that has received wide attention of late, and motivated much research
aimed at detecting fake news automatically; a comprehensive and recent survey is given in Shu
et al. (2017). Many approaches are based on the content of the news. Some of these approaches
1http://www.metacert.com
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find their roots in the much older work aimed at detecting spam; see for instance Mason (2002);
Vukovi et al. (2009). Wang (2017) uses deep learning, LSTMs, and SVMs to classify about 12,000
sort text statements from Politifact; Riedel et al. (2017); Ahmed et al. (2017) used a text TF-IDF
model followed by a neural net to classify a few thousands text items. The writing style has been
used in Potthast et al. (2017) to classify 1,600 items from BuzzFeed.
An extensive study was performed in Castillo et al. (2011), which collected tweets verging on
2,500 topics that were trending on Twitter between April and July 2010. The topics were classified
on the basis of the features of the users and the tweets belonging to the topics, showing high
classification accuracy for the topics; the best-performing classification algorithm was based on a
decision-tree classifier. The social dynamics on Twitter and the temporal propagation of posts has
been the subject of a very extensive study in Shao et al. (2017), with the aim of quantifying the
effect of bot accounts, detecting them, and tracing how the information spreads. The study is
similar to ours in extent, involving millions of news items and Twitter users.
Temporal aspects of news spreading have been studied and correlated to the reliability of news
in Ma et al. (2015), where about a million tweets are used to analyze a hundred news items, and
in Shao et al. (2016), where large-scale measurements are provided.
The present work is inspired by work on reputation systems, in which the specific identity of
users is used as a feature. Some notable recent work in this direction is Tacchini et al. (2017), some
of whose algorithms we study in this paper, and Ruchansky et al. (2017), where user identities are
fed along with text into a deep-learning system.
3 Dataset
3.1 Dataset composition
To characterize the performance of reputation systems for news spread via Twitter, it is essential to
have a dataset that covers the full spectrum of news that are shared on Twitter, from mainstream
sites, to sites whose news quality is less certain. Since our concern is news reputation, rather than
individual tweet reputation, we identify news with URLs, and we restricted our attention to tweets
that contain at least one URL.
Ideally, we would like our dataset to include all URL-containing tweets and construct the full
bipartite graph with URLs on one side, and Twitter users mentioning those URLs on the other
side. However, acquiring this much data would be prohibitively expensive. We therefore settled on
a sampling strategy that allowed us to collect a large number of news-related tweets and re-tweets,
and build a significative sub-graph. We achieved this by gathering URL-containing tweets using
the Twitter streaming API. We collected all Tweets from August 1, 2017 until December 8, 2017
that satisfied at least one of the following filters:
• Mainstream news: all tweets containing URLs from a list of mainstream news sites, including
ABC News, Breitbart, BuzzFeed, CBS News, Channel 7 News, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC,
NBC News, The Huffington Post, The Economist, The Guardian, The Hill, The Onion, The
New York Post, The New York Times, The Times, The US Herald, The Washington Post,
USA Today, and US News;
• News agencies: all tweets from The Associated Press and Reuters;
• Scientific, and peer-reviewed news: all tweets from ArXiV, Nature, and Science Magazine;
• Fact-checking sites: all tweets from Politifact and Snopes;
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Site % Site %
youtube.com 4.319 wordpress.com 0.754
nytimes.com 3.145 nypost.com 0.625
theguardian.com 2.904 thehill.com 0.619
huffingtonpost.com 1.964 latimes.com 0.616
washingtonpost.com 1.944 breitbart.com 0.609
arxiv.org 1.585 cbsnews.com 0.563
usatoday.com 1.504 reuters.com 0.426
indiatimes.com 1.458 reddit.com 0.388
foxnews.com 1.262 dailycaller.com 0.367
blogspot.com 1.202 newsmax.com 0.336
Table 1: The 20 news sites with the most URLs in our dataset in the period from September 1 to
November 30, 2017.
• News from selected users: all tweets from a set of about 160 users, which included many of
the most active tweeters in news and science; and
• Low-quality news: all tweets that mentioned URLs from many of the sites mentioned as
fake, bias, unreliable, clickbait, or consipiracy in the lists ?Opensources (2017). The original
lists consisted of 1,000 sites; we excluded many that seemed to be no longer active, or that
published news only sporadically.
In addition, we ran specific queries aimed at completing the graph, by periodically querying (within
the limits of the Twitter API) for URLs that were mentioned only once or twice, in the attempt to
find more tweets referencing these URLs; and users from whom we had a limited number of tweets,
in the attempt to discover further activity from such users.
Overall, between the streaming and the graph-completion queries, we gathered about a million
URL-containing tweets per day. Upon gathering each tweet, we parsed it, and we downloaded the
HTML of the reference page. From the semantic tags (og:url, og:title, and og:description)
in the HTML we extracted and stored the canonical URL, the title, and the description.
We report in Table 1 the list of news sites with the most URLs in the dataset for the period
from September 1 to November 30, 2017.
Once the tweets and the URLs had been obtained, we processed the dataset and we associated
with each URL the following information:
• URL date: the date at which we first saw the URL.
• Users: the list of Twitter usernames who shared the URL.
• Title: the title of the news article, as given in the og:title social tag.
• Description: the description of the news article, as given in the og:description tag.
3.2 Ground Truth
All the machine learning algorithms that we utilize follow into the category of semi-supervised
learning algorithms. In order to train them we need a set of example URLs that we can reliably
categorize as good (reliable news) or bad (fake and misleading news). We refer to this set of
categorized URLs as ground truth.
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Ideally we would like to utilize a large, unbiased, and possibly crowdsourced, ground truth.
Unfortunately, such a set is not currently available to the authors. Most sets of crowdsourced
URLs are fairly small, generally numbering less than 1,000 URLs. It is difficult to build, on the
basis of such small sets, algorithms that generalize well to the whole set of news being shared on
Twitter. Furthermore, and perhaps even more importantly, if the testing set is small it does not
yield useful information on the algorithms’ performance because we cannot extrapolate the results
to the full set of URLs collected on Twitter, which is the question that interests us here.
As the next-best solution, we use as ground truth, two curated lists of news sites publishing (in
the opinions of the curators) fake, misleading, unchecked, and biased news: the Metacert list, and
the Opensources list.
• Opensources list. The Opensources list consists of sites derived from a list originally posted
by Melissa Zimdars Opensources (2017). We kept all sites in that list with type bias, fake,
junksci, hate, conspiracy, or clickbait. This resulted in 581 sites.
• Metacert list. The Metacert list consists of sites flagged as fake, misleading, or unreliable news
sources using a crowdsourcing method by Metacert2, and kindly shared with the authors. The
list consists of 500 sites.
These two lists have partial overlap, sharing 331 sites.
Using these two lists as ground truth entails two problems. First, the lists consist of sites,
not of URLs. There is thus the risk that our algorithms simply learn the sites, rather than the
characteristics of fake news. We have taken two steps to counter this. As mentioned above, we
ensure that no information used in the machine learning directly mentions the site. In particular,
we remove all mentions of the sites where the news appear (and their aliases) from the content we
use as ML feature. Further, we will present extensive results on cross-learning, in which we use one
set of sites (for instance, the Metacert list) to infer the reliability of URLs belonging to another set
of sites (for instance, the Opensources list).
The second problem is that the Metacert and Opensources lists are only partial lists of sites
containing unreliable information. Even when we use the union of the two lists of sites, we certainly
cannot assume that all URLs not belonging to these sites contain reliable news. In other words,
the false positives of our machine learning — the URLs that are labeled as low reputation, but do
not belong to a site in the list — may not be mistakes, in the sense that they may consist in part
of URLs that, upon examination, reveal themselves to be fake or misleading news. For this reason,
when reporting the performance of the ML algorithms, we will not blindly accept the classification
given by the ground truth. Rather, we will report detailed results on which news sites are reported
to contain low-reputation news, and in what proportion. As we will see, the ML algorithms we
study in general have the useful ability to discover fake and unreliable news beyond those that
belong to the ground truth.
To give an idea of the breadth of news collected, we give in Figure 1 the correlation between the
main news sites, and the sites appearing in the union of the Opensources and Metacert lists on one
side, and the scientific site arxiv.org on the other. We compute the correlation between two sites
i, j as Tij/
√
TiTj where Tij counts the number of users that tweeted about both domains weighted
by their number of tweets; Ti and Tj count the number of users that twitted about domain i and
j respectively, also weighted by the number of tweets.
2https://metacert.com/
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Figure 1: Average correlation of most tweeted news sites with known fake news sites (Opensources +
Metacert lists) vs correlation with science related (arxiv.org). The area of each circle is proportional
to the number of URLs we have from each site. The data is from November 1 to November 7, 2017.
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4 Methods
We build reputation systems for news shared on Twitter following three different approaches. In
the first approach, we consider each user who shared the news article, and each word that appears
in the title and description of the article itself, as an individual feature. This gives rise to a large
number of features, on which we train a simple logistic regression model Tacchini et al. (2017).
In the second approach, we aggregate users and title/description words using topic analysis, and
we then train neural network classifiers based on the resulting topics. In the third approach, we
implement the “harmonic” crowdsourcing algorithm described in de Alfaro et al. (2015); Tacchini
et al. (2017).
4.1 Logistic-regression classifier based on users and words
4.1.1 Architecture
Our first and simplest model is from Tacchini et al. (2017): we use as list of features for a piece
of news (a URL after canonicalization) the individual users who shared the URL by tweeting or
retweeting it, alongside with the words that appear in the title and description of the news article
itself. This gives rise to a large set of features, numbering in the hundred of thousands: each user
and each word is a feature.
On this large, and rather sparse feature set, we train a simple logistic regression model. Logistic
regression models are well suited to coping with large and sparse feature sets. Intuitively, the
coefficient associated with each user is positive if the user tends to share high-reputation news,
and negative if the user tends to share low-reputation news. Similarly, the coefficient of a word is
positive if the word tends to appear in the title or description of high-reputation news, and negative
if the word tends to appear in the title or description of low-reputation news.
We consider three kind of models:
• LR-U, built on users only.
• LR-UT, built on users and title/description text.
• LR-T, built on title/description text only.
The models are all implemented using the scikit-learn Python package. Since our ground truth
is based on sites, rather than individual URLs, we removed from the title and descriptions all
mentions of the news site to which the individual URLs belong, to avoid having a “cheat factor”
in the experiments.
4.1.2 Training and testing datasets
To evaluate the logistic-regression based classification methods, we split the dataset into training
and testing datasets, as follows.
• The full training dataset consists of all URLs that have been first seen from September 1st,
2017, to October 20, 2017. For each URL, we keep all the tweets whose timestamp is strictly
before October 30, 2017.
• The full testing dataset consists of all URLs that have been first seen from October 31, 2017,
to November 26, 2017. For each URL, we keep all the tweets that mention it.
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Dataset URLs Tweets
Training dataset 787,601 14,587,984
Min-2 training dataset 275,400 14,075,783
Testing dataset 607,299 7,967,170
Table 2: Sizes of training and testing datasets for logistic-regression based classifiers.
Number of URLs
Opensources Metacert Common Total
Train 21,263 21,146 14,339 787,601
Min-2 train 13,213 13,305 9,104 275,400
Test 13,388 11,740 9,210 607,299
Table 3: Number of URLs in the Opensources and Metacert lists that appear in our training and
testing sets for logistic-regression classifiers, alongside the total number of URLs in the datasets.
The construction of the full training and testing datasets ensures that the URLs they contain are
disjoint, and that the testing dataset is built only from information that chronologically precedes
all of the information in the testing dataset. The interval from October 20 to October 30, 2017,
allows us to collect tweets mentioning the URLs seen first on October 20 for 9 additional days,
until midnight of October 29 (all dates used in the experiment are in UTC).
As the full training and testing datasets are quite large, we subsampled them by keeping only
the tweets appearing on alternating days, starting from September 1, and October 31, respectively.
Furthermore, we obtained a min-2 training dataset by considering only URLs that were retweeted
at least twice; this weeded out from the training set many low-significance URLs, and let to higher
classification precision for mainstream news, as we will see. The characteristics of the resulting
datasets are reported in Table 2.
The composition of the two ground truths is summarized in Table 3. As the number of positive
and negative instances in the training set is highly unbalanced (in the training dataset, only 21,263
of 787,601 URLs are considered fake news), we train the logistic classifier giving class weights that
are inversely proportional to class sizes, thus minimizing per-class errors.
4.2 Topic-based models
A limitation of the above logistic-based classification model is that we can assign coefficients only
to users and words that we have seen in our ground truth. In particular, if a user u′ has been
recently sharing similar URLs as users u1 and u2, and we have extensive data on the quality of
the URLs shared by u1 and u2 but not by u
′, we still cannot attribute a coefficient (a positive or
negative influence) to u′. Topic-based models extract the common behavioral similarities among
users, summarizing them in a number of topics that each user is likely to share. We can then train
our models on the basis of topics, rather than individual users. In the example above, the topic
preference of u′ would be close to the one of u1 and u2, so if we knew how the topic preference of
u1 and u2 and how those topics are associated to high or low reputation news, we could transfer
this information to u′.
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4.2.1 Architecture
We create our topic models by following the classical Latent-Dirichelet Allocation models (LDA) for
text Blei et al. (2003). We considered each URL as a document, with the users that shared that URL
as the words, and we applied standard LDA-based topic-modeling to the resulting document corpus
via Gensim Rˇeh˚urˇek and Sojka (2010). We constructed the topic modeling on the joint dataset
consisting of both training and testing data. Constructing topic models is a fully unsupervised
operation which can be easily repeated periodically (e.g., once a day), so that in practice it is
feasible to maintain an updated topic model encompassing the whole dataset. Constructing the
topic modeling on the joint dataset enabled us to exploit behavior similarity between the users in
the training dataset, and those appearing only in the testing dataset.
Once the topic model was constructed, we used Gensim to map each URL, with its sharing
users, to a topic vector. We first experimented with training a logistic classifier on topic vectors,
but this worked rather poorly. The topics provide rich semantical information, and apparently it
is necessary to consider the conjunctions, and disjunctions, of topics in order to arrive at a good
classification of news URLs. Thus, after some experimentation, we settled on a neural-net classifier
with one 100-neuron hidden layer with rectified liner activation, and one final neuron outputting
the classification. Again, due to class imbalance between the true and fake classes, in the learning
we use class weights that are inversely proportional to class size.
4.2.2 Training and testing datasets
Due to computational limitations (topic decomposition is an expensive operation), we used some-
what smaller datasets than the ones previously described. Precisely:
• The raw training datasets consists of all URLs with at least two tweets that were first seen
in 2017 on September 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, 21, 25, 29, and October 3, 7, 11, 15, 19. This dataset
contained 144,137 URLs, and encompassed 7,395,756 tweets.
• The raw testing dataset consisted, as in Section 4.1, in all URLs first seen on alternating days,
starting on October 31, and ending in November 26, 2017. This dataset contained 607,299
URLs, encompassing 7,967,170 tweets.
To further simplify the problem computationally, we noted that URLs that are shared only a few
times, and users who share only occasionally, do not contribute much information to the topic
factorization. Hence, we computed the topic factorization on the basis of URLs and users in the
union of the raw training and testing datasets that appeared at least 5 times.
Once the topic modeling was computed, we used our raw training set above to train the neural
net on the basis of the URL topics. As testing set, again to simplify the problem computationally
,we considered a random subsampling of 20% of the raw testing set mentioned above, resulting in
121,460 URLs. The compositions of the training and testing sets is given in Table 4.
4.3 Crowdsourcing-based models
The third method we applied is based on the crowdsourcing-inspired “harmonic boolean label
crowdsourcing” model of de Alfaro et al. (2015); Tacchini et al. (2017). As for topic modeling, the
crowdsourcing models are developed on the entire dataset; indeed, the system we use for Twitter
data acquisition is able to run the harmonic model computation every few hours, ensuring that
up-to-date results are always available.
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Number of URLs
Opensources Metacert Common Total
Train 7,069 7,032 4,876 144,137
Test 2,664 2,331 1,810 121,460
Table 4: Number of URLs in the Opensources and Metacert lists that appear in our training and
testing sets for topic modeling. The different proportion of URLs that belong to the Opensources
and Metacert sets, compared to the total URLs, depends on the fact that the training set consists
only of URLs that were shared at least twice.
In boolean label crowdsourcing models, users provide True/False labels for a set of items, and
the crowdsourcing algorithms then attribute to each item an estimate of truth or falsehood, and to
each user an estimate of how much the user is likely to tell the truth or to lie Karger et al. (2011);
Liu et al. (2012). As in Tacchini et al. (2017), we use a variant of these methods in which the truth
or falsehood of a subset of items is taken as known; the algorithms then propagate the information
to the remaining users and items. We use the harmonic algorithm of de Alfaro et al. (2015), both
because it is efficient on very large-scale data, and because it has been shown to give good results
in Tacchini et al. (2017).
4.3.1 The harmonic algorithm
We represent our entire dataset as a bipartite graph (I ∪ U, T ), where I are the news items, U are
the users, and T ⊆ I × U are the shares, so that a share (i, u) represents user u tweeting item i.
We denote by ∂i = {u | (i, u) ∈ L} and ∂u = {i | (i, u) ∈ L} the 1-neighborhoods of an item i ∈ I
and user u ∈ U , respectively.
The harmonic algorithm maintains for each node v ∈ I ∪ U two non-negative parameters αv,
βv defining a beta distribution: intuitively, for a user u, αu − 1 represents the number of times we
have seen the user share a reliable news item, and βu − 1 represents the number of times we have
seen the user share an unreliable item. Similarly, for a news item i, αi − 1 is the number of shares
from reliable users, and βi − 1 the number of shares from unreliable users. For each node v, let
qv = (αv−βv)/(αv +βv): for a news item i, positive values of qi indicate a likely reliable news, and
negative values, a likely hoax.
Let the training set consist of two subsets IF , IN ⊆ I of fake and non-fake news. The algorithm
sets qi := −1 for all i ∈ IF , and qi := 1 for all i ∈ IN ; it sets qi = 0 for all other posts i ∈ I\(IF ∪IN ).
The algorithm then proceeds by iteratively propagating the information from items to users, and
from users to items. First, for each user u ∈ U , it lets:
αu := c+
∑
{qi | i ∈ ∂u, qi > 0}
βu := c−
∑
{qi | i ∈ ∂u, qi < 0} .
The positive constant c = 0.02 acts as regularization. In the second part of the iteration, the
algorithm updates the values for each item i ∈ I \ (IF ∪ IN ) (without affecting the ground truth)
by:
αi := c+
∑
{qu | u ∈ ∂i, qu > 0}
βi := c−
∑
{qu | u ∈ ∂i, qu < 0} .
10
Full Training Min-2 Training Harmonic
LR-U LR-UT LR-T LR-U LR-UT LR-T Topics 1x 4x
All URLs Hoax recall: 57.64 61.14 57.25 46.84 53.25 53.21 54.80 91.20 74.34
Nonhoax recall: 97.40 97.75 94.18 98.76 98.51 94.82 93.88 89.74 96.69
Hoax precision: 33.30 38.15 18.15 46.14 44.61 18.81 16.50 16.64 32.87
URLs with ≥2 shares Hoax recall: 72.12 71.69 62.69 63.94 66.76 59.19 66.56 91.20 74.34
Nonhoax recall: 95.62 96.66 91.73 97.55 97.84 93.25 92.23 89.74 96.60
Hoax precision: 41.44 49.19 24.54 46.14 57.07 27.34 26.60 16.64 32.87
URLs with ≥5 shares Hoax recall: 82.57 81.27 67.38 79.03 78.94 64.93 76.32 91.83 69.79
Nonhoax recall: 95.47 96.66 90.14 97.00 97.49 92.24 92.83 85.44 95.32
Hoax precision: 50.24 57.43 27.46 52.83 63.56 31.66 36.12 24.79 43.75
URLs with ≥10 shares Hoax recall: 87.14 85.43 69.90 85.43 84.80 68.06 83.13 93.52 70.83
Nonhoax recall: 95.64 96.63 88.91 96.77 97.33 91.50 93.20 84.54 95.43
Hoax precision: 54.28 60.16 27.24 61.10 65.37 32.23 40.70 25.44 46.62
Table 5: Hoax and non-hoax recall, and hoax precision, expressed as percentages, for the news
reputation systems compared in this paper. The methods are LR-U: logistic regression based on
users; LR-UT: logistic regression based on users and text; LR-T: logistic regression based on text;
Topics: topic analysis, and Harmonic: harmonic crowdsourcing algorithm. For logistic regression,
we report results for two training sets: the full one, and the one consisting of URLs that have been
shared at least twice. For the other methods, we only report results on the full training set. For
Harmonic, we report the results with both 1x and 4x sampling of good URLs. The results are
based on the Opensources ground truth.
We experimented with various numbers of iterations, and we settled on using four iterations, which
seem sufficient to spread information from the labeled nodes. Once the iterations are concluded, we
classify a news item i as fake if qi < 0, and as reliable otherwise; thus, we take qi as the reputation
of i.
4.3.2 Training and testing datasets
The harmonic algorithm, as mentioned, is run on our entire graph of URL and tweets; the graph
consists to date of 5.5 million URLs and 88 million tweets. We use as training set the approximately
2.5 million URLs collected before October 15, 2017, and as testing set, the approximately 2.5 million
URLs collected after November 1st, 2017. In the training set, we take as negative ground truth
all URLs that belong to the Opensources or Metacert ground truths; let n be the number of such
URLs. As n 2, 500, 000, if we labeled positively all the remaining URLs in the training set, the
training set would have a strong class imbalance. The harmonic algorithm does not come with
a “control knob” comparable to class weight normalization for logistic regression. To obtain a
balance between the number of URLs labeled positively and negatively for training, we sample a
subset of URLs not in the Opensources and Metacert lists, and we will label only those positively.
We consider two subsamplings: the 1x subsampling, in which we subsample n URLs, and the 4x
subsampling, in which we subsample 4n URLs.
5 Results
Table 5 summarizes the results for the various algorithms under consideration. For each algorithm,
and each test-set, we report:
• Hoax recall: the percentage of hoax news in the testing dataset that the algorithm correctly
labels as hoaxes.
• Nonhoax recall: the percentage of non-hoax news in the testing dataset that the algorithm
correctly labels as non-hoaxes.
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• Hoax precision: the percentage of news in the hoax-labeled news in the testing dataset that
are indeed hoaxes.
The hoax and nonhoax recalls, together, give a picture of the classification correctness for each
of the two classes. Generally, we see that the best-performing algorithm is the simple logistic
regression based on individual users and words, trained on the whole dataset. We note that the
topic modeling algorithm is not competitive with the one based on simple logistic regression. What
is more, the benefit of the algorithm based on simple features over topic modeling is maintained
in spite of the fact that the topics are generated over the union of the testing and training sets, as
explained in Section 4.2.1. We also see that using textual information helps mostly for URLs that
are shared only once. Text information alone yields inferior results, chiefly due to the low precision
of the resulting classifiers.
However, these overall results tell only half of the story. For the true insight, we need to look
at the outcome of the algorithms on individual news sites.
5.1 A look at individual news sites
To gain a better understanding of the performance of the algorithms, it is useful to look at the
classification results for individual news sites, reported in Table 6. The results indicate that if we
train on the full dataset, the percentages of major news sites URLs that the algorithms label as
hoaxes are rather high. For instance, about 2% of URL of the Washington Post are classified as
hoaxes, and so are 1% of the URLs from Reuters and The New York Times. In our preliminary
experiments, users were negatively impressed when the system labeled as possible hoaxes news that
were obviously reliable and came from news sites with strong editorial controls. Precision of hoax
detection on mainstream news sites was highly valued by our users, much more so than missing
the occasional hoax that was shared only a few times (and was thus, likely, a fairly obscure news
piece). Compounding the problem, these are among the largest and most shared news sites, so that
even a small percentage of errors translates into a large number of URLs labeled as hoaxes. For
this reason, we find the results obtained with the Min-2 training set to be preferable in practice.
Further, we note that not all sites that have a high percentage of URLs labeled as hoaxes in
Table 6 are known for their high standards of journalistic accuracy and editorial controls. Indeed,
the reputation systems seem to be able to use the Opensources and Metacert list to discover other
unreliable sites. This occurs because the reputation systems assign low reputation (low factors) to
the users who share known unreliable news, and then follow those users to other news they have
shared. As a consequence, the precision figures reported in Table 5 may be underestimates: many
of the URLs labeled as hoaxes that belong to sites beyond those in the two ground-truth lists may
indeed be hoaxes or misleading news.
5.2 Cross-ground-truth prediction
To validate the ability of the reputation systems for fake news to discover additional unreliable news
and sites, we conducted an experiment. The two ground truths at our disposal, which have been
developed independently, share only 331 of 581 (Opensources) and 500 (Metacert) sites respectively.
Thus, we can ask the question: starting from one ground truth, how good are our reputation systems
at discovering the additional URLs and sites in the other ground truth? From Table 6, we see that
sites with over 5% hoax detection are of uncertain quality, worthy of manual investigation by a
human. Taking 5% as the threshold for fake or misleading, and starting from a ground truth, we
measured:
12
LR-UT LR-U Harmonic
Full Train Min-2 Train Full Train Min-2 Train Entire, 1x Entire, 4x
OS MC OS MC OS MC OS MC OS MC OS MC
nytimes.com 0.88 0.83 0.42 0.35 0.83 0.73 0.19 0.14 4.10 3.95 1.37 1.18
theguardian.com 1.16 1.02 0.48 0.40 0.97 0.93 0.29 0.16 5.13 4.81 1.75 1.60
huffingtonpost.com 2.61 1.96 1.12 0.65 1.43 1.40 0.53 0.46 7.91 7.24 2.72 2.36
washingtonpost.com 1.92 2.12 0.77 0.80 3.07 2.98 0.38 0.33 7.32 7.46 2.45 2.10
arxiv.org 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.59 0.45 0.19 0.22
usatoday.com 1.09 1.13 0.56 0.42 0.84 0.63 0.17 0.14 4.43 4.23 1.48 1.12
foxnews.com 1.91 2.01 1.08 0.91 3.07 2.77 1.42 0.78 40.43 37.34 8.05 5.67
nypost.com 3.42 3.20 1.99 1.71 3.70 3.36 1.12 1.28 17.94 17.01 4.90 3.92
thehill.com 3.39 3.43 1.79 1.60 4.64 3.55 1.91 1.09 14.71 14.09 3.96 3.31
latimes.com 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.42 0.17 0.17 2.71 2.75 0.83 0.56
breitbart.com 5.10 3.39 3.73 1.79 11.04 9.37 6.32 4.76 77.96 82.20 20.75 13.05
cbsnews.com 1.53 1.88 0.57 0.44 1.62 1.22 0.52 0.39 11.07 10.46 3.92 3.36
reuters.com 1.16 1.11 0.44 0.44 1.07 0.93 0.62 0.36 3.54 3.26 1.29 0.98
dailycaller.com 25.00 41.38 16.76 32.07 50.58 56.59 39.63 50.58 86.41 85.99 29.07 20.77
townhall.com 31.41 16.74 21.33 14.13 38.88 23.49 28.71 16.2 78.53 76.85 31.31 18.96
truthfeednews.com 21.31 2.95 16.8 2.33 18.82 1.87 15.71 2.64 98.28 97.58 81.92 35.75
hotair.com 9.40 2.03 2.99 0.96 15.60 10.15 10.58 7.48 87.38 86.22 11.40 7.01
freedomdaily.com 88.89 87.96 89.81 86.11 81.48 78.70 79.63 77.78 95.88 96.30 79.42 71.60
conservativedailypost.com 93.20 92.37 95.88 95.46 84.54 81.03 79.38 73.61 98.18 98.18 92.66 87.89
lucianne.com 15.65 96.56 2.67 96.56 89.31 96.56 77.48 96.56 99.14 98.45 26.42 34.37
redstate.com 39.23 14.67 38.92 9.57 39.23 18.18 26.48 11.96 78.81 71.72 23.60 10.77
theblaze.com 43.06 24.07 37.96 14.81 16.67 12.50 5.09 4.63 76.01 73.99 20.61 11.92
newsbusters.org 18.22 21.78 14.22 21.78 29.33 31.56 20.89 31.11 89.98 89.74 17.53 11.20
zerohedge.com 28.18 19.86 18.24 6.47 31.18 23.33 16.40 9.24 80.24 67.62 45.88 17.12
Table 6: Percentage of URLs that are classified as hoaxes for some news sites, including the top
news websites of Table 1. Min-2 Train is the training set consisting of URLs that were shared at
least twice; Full Train is the full training set. OS stands for Opensources ground truth; MC stands
for Metacert ground truth.
N. of Detection
URLs in Direct Suspicious
GT Mtd. Train diff URL Site URL
OS LR-UT Min-2 2530 13.9 75.0 93.2
OS LR-U Min-2 2530 32.7 66.7 89.1
MC LR-UT Min-2 4178 9.5 56.7 70.0
MC LR-U Min-2 4178 9.1 56.7 68.2
OS LR-UT Full 2530 21.7 91.7 95.5
OS LR-U Full 2530 42.6 75.0 93.3
MC LR-UT Full 4178 15.0 76.7 88.9
MC LR-U Full 4178 18.3 76.7 83.9
Table 7: Cross dataset detection percentages of fake news and misleading URLs, starting from the
ground truth (GT) Opensources (OS) and Metacert (MT).
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• Direct URL detection: what percentage of URLs appearing only in the other ground truth
do we label as hoaxes?
• Site detection: how many sites of the other ground truth with at least 20 URLs in the dataset
do we detect as fake or misleading?
• Suspicious URL detection: what percentage of URLs appearing only in the other ground
truth belong to suspicious sites?
For site detection, the limitation of sites with at least 20 URLs removes both inactive sites, and
sites on which we have so few URLs that computing statistics is unreliable. The results are given
in Table 7. As we see, direct URL detection is low: this is in line with the results in Table 6,
where we see that only part of URLs belonging to other fake or misleading sites are flagged as
hoaxes. On the other hand, the detection of fake or misleading URLs is high, above 80% using full
training sets, and above about 70% for the more conservative Min-2 training set. We observe that
the Opensources ground truth is more predictive of the Metacert ground truth than the other way
round.
6 Discussion
We believe that the challenge of building a reputation system for online news sources consists in
creating an algorithm that is able to flag a large portion of fake news, while only minimally affecting
mainstream news coming from publications with high journalistic standards and editorial controls.
We obtained the best results via logistic-regression approaches trained on URLs shared via
Twitter that were shared more than once, considering users and title/description words as features.
These models had false positive rates for mainstream news sites and they were generally below 1%,
as can be seen from Table 6, while yielding an 85% recall for low-quality news URLs shared more
than 10 times.
Algorithms including only users as features worked almost as well as algorithms that included
also title and description as features, except on URLs that were shared only once. Our experi-
ments also indicate that algorithms that treat individual users as topics, such as the logistic and
crowdsourcing ones, offer superior performance compared to those that consider common features
of users as topics. We believe this likely happens because on Twitter some users acts as indicators
for particular types of news, systematically (re)tweeting a large portion of them. Indeed, we have
reasons to suspect that some of the users having large influence (weights) in the logistic-regression
based methods may be bots and this is something we intend to explore in future work. We note
that our results on topic modeling are preliminary: there may well be more sophisticated ways of
applying topic modeling that lead to superior results.
The “harmonic” crowdsourcing-inspired approach worked fairly well. Its main benefit seems
to lie in its ability to spread information from a ground truth to a much wider set of news items
and users. Another benefit is that, uniquely among the algorithms we considered, it supports
incremental learning. In Table 6, we note that the harmonic method leads to the least differences
in classification starting from our two different ground truths. The harmonic method however has
two weaknesses. First, it is based in a very specific graph algorithm that cannot be extended with
additional features in the same way as other machine-learning algorithms can. Second, tuning
the harmonic method to deliver good results is a very time-consuming process. In most machine-
learning algorithms, one can start with small training and testing sets, experiment with hyper-
parameters such as class weights, and then run on larger datasets. The harmonic algorithm, on the
other hand, relies heavily on the connectivity structure of the graph, and it is not obvious how to
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properly sub-sample the graph to conduct small-scale experiments whose results can be extended
to the complete graph.
Our results also highlight an interesting ability of the reputation algorithms considered, namely,
their ability to identify fake and misleading news sites that were not known to us in advance. Indeed,
some of the news sites in Table 6 first came to the attention of the authors when looking for false
positives. This suggests an additional use of reputation systemsm for news: as a tool that helps
human moderators and fact checkers find more sites that deserve inspection.
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